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Abstract 
Historically, Turkey has adopted a reactive approach to natural hazards which resulted in 
significant losses. However, following the 1999 Kocaeli Earthquake, a more proactive 
approach has been adopted. This study aims to explore the way this new approach operates 
on the ground. A multi-national and multi-disciplinary team conducted a field investigation 
following the 2011 Van Earthquake to identify lessons to inform healthcare emergency 
planning in Turkey and elsewhere. The team interviewed selected stakeholders including, 
healthcare emergency responders, search and rescue services, ambulance services, and health 
authority representatives, in addition to conducting a focus group. Data were analysed 
according to an open coding process and SWOT analysis. The findings suggest that the 
approach succeeded in developing a single vision by consolidating official efforts in a more 
structured way, mobilising many governmental and non-governmental organisations, 
securing significant amounts of resources including physical and human, and increasing the 
resilience and flexibility of infrastructure to expand its capacity. However, more attention is 
required to the development of stronger management procedures and acquisition of further 
resources. 
 
1. Introduction 
Turkey is a tectonically active country, located across 326 faults with approximately 66% of 
its area laid on active faults subjecting 70% of the population to a high risk of earthquakes. 
Within the last century, the country was hit by many earthquakes, the greatest of which were 
the 1939 Erzincan (magnitude M7.9) and the 1999 Kocaeli (M7.4) earthquakes with a 
mortality toll of 50,000 people. The latest of this series took place on 23rd October 2011 at 
13:41 local time measuring a moment magnitude of Mw7.1. The epicentre was located 
between Van and Erciş cities as shown in Figure 1. The event was followed by over 6,200 
aftershocks with North-East and South-West spread (see Figure 2). One of these aftershocks 
took place on 9 November 2011 in the south of Van measuring Mw5.6 (see Figure 3), as a 
result of the stress that was building up during the aftershocks (Aydan et al., 2012). The 
main- and after-shocks caused wide spread damage that was estimated at €1.2 billion. 
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Figure 1 – Epicentre of Van Earthquake of 23 October 2011 (Source: KOERI) 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Aftershock epicentres magnitude Mw3 and above (Source: KOERI) 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Epicentre of main aftershock of 9 November 2011 (Source: KOERI) 
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1.1 Van earthquake 
Van and Erciş cities are located in the province of Van, population of approximately 1.023 
million people representing 1.4% of the total Turkish population. The cities’ combined 
populations count for almost half of the population of the province. 
 
The Van Earthquake was characterised by “a smooth and bilateral rupture” (Irmak et al., 
2012), causing widespread damage, 604 fatalities and 2,608 injuries. The aftershock of 9 
November caused much more structural damage (Güney, 2012) in addition to causing a 
further 40 deaths due to the collapse of Bayram Hotel (Erdik et al., 2012). Approximately 
4,000 buildings collapsed or were severely damaged (Güney, 2012) despite the fact that the 
peak ground acceleration was as low as 150-200cm/sec2 (Çelebi et al., 2013). Erdik et al. 
(2012) reported that hospital and school buildings performed better than in previous 
experience due to changes in their design requirements. This statement most probably refers 
to newly built schools and hospitals, as most of the old facilities were damaged resulting in 
the authorities’ decision to demolish and reconstruct these. As a consequence of the main 
shock, 200,000 people were forced to reside in 3,800 prefabricated Mevlana houses, 2,700 
container houses and 14 tent cities. This is in addition to 40,000 who migrated to other 
regions due to anxiety, distress and lack of trust in the resilience of their buildings.  
 
There was limited damage to critical city lifelines (e.g. water, power, gas, and roads). The 
majority of these were restored within several hours, but some took up to a week. This 
situation enabled the efforts of the emergency teams as they were able to search and transfer 
injuries to medical centres. There were 476 search and rescue (SAR) teams who succeeded in 
saving the lives of 230 people buried under the rubble (Erdik et al., 2012). 
 
1.2 Emergency response 
For many years Turkey followed a reactive approach to disasters (Unlu et al., 2010). 
Significant resources were allocated to respond to emergencies with the view that this would 
reduce the impact of disasters. The approach was mainly driven by ‘fate, reaction and 
recovery, wait and see, ex-post, crisis management, ad-hoc efforts, and development at risk’ 
(Tufekci, 2012). However, following the 1999 Kocaeli (İzmit) Earthquake the Turkish 
authorities realised that planning is also a key element for disaster risk reduction as many 
buildings, municipalities, industry, emergency and response agencies were not ready for 
disasters despite the number of ambulances sent to the stricken areas. The main lessons learnt 
were the need to; (1) increase the resilience of telecommunication systems (landline and 
mobile), (2) save capital through minimising resource losses, (3) improve organisation and 
coordination (in search and rescue, reduce bureaucracy, enhancement of logistical support, 
and train and organise voluntary efforts), and (4) integrate resilience in the development 
(building resilient infrastructure and public buildings, enforcing codes, improving inspection 
during construction). This led to a new approach that is driven by: “choice, proactivity, 
mitigation, anticipation and prevention, ex-ante, risk management, comprehensive approach, 
and sustainable development” (Tufekci 2012). This study aims to collect information on the 
way this new approach has been implemented in order to identify key lessons. 
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Table 1 - Earthquake occurred in Turkey in the last 20 years sorted by numbers of killed (Source: EM-DAT, 
www.emdat.be) 
 
Earthquake Date No Killed Affected Injured Damage ($US million) 
İzmit Körfezi 17/08/1999 17,127 1,358,953 43,953 20,000 
Düzce 12/11/1999 845 224,948 4,948 1,000 
Erzincan 13/03/1992 653 250,000 3,850 750 
Erciş-Van 23/10/2011 604 6,786 2,608 1,500 
Bingöl 01/05/2003 177 290,520 520 135 
Ceyhan-Adana 28/06/1998 145 1,589,600 16,000 550 
Dinar 01/10/1995 94 160,240 240 206 
Afyon-Sultandağı 03/02/2002 42 222,000 327 96 
Corum-Amasya 14/08/1996 0 17,000 6 30 
 
2. Methodology 
This study adopted a qualitative research methodology to “provide rich descriptions of 
phenomena” and “enhance understanding of the context of events as well as the events 
themselves” (Sofaer, 1999). Two months after the earthquakes an international team, 
comprising researchers from England, Italy, Japan and Turkey, conducted field investigations 
(10-15 December 2011). Data were collected both in the stricken areas of Erciş, Van and 
Istanbul and involved unstructured interviews and a focus group. Twelve unstructured 
interviews were conducted with emergency responders representing healthcare providers, 
search and rescue services, voluntary organisations, ambulance services and health authority 
representatives. Interviewees represented most of emergency planning and response levels 
(from transport and treatment of casualties to developing and implementing strategic 
decisions). Fifteen people involved in the rescue and relief activities in Van (psychologists, 
emergency physicians, nurses, public health officers, midwifes, paramedics) participated in 
the focus group. The interviews and the focus group were conducted in Turkish, with the 
support of a professional translator, and recorded. Collected data were supplemented with 
information distilled from literature, including: research papers, reports, government and non-
governmental codes, guidelines and databases. The research was guided with a set of research 
questions (see Table 2). 
 
Data were organised in an open coding process, in which interviews were analysed and sorted 
under different subthemes allocated under two main themes: (1) surge capacity (resources); 
and (2) processes in mass casualty event (MCE) management (Ryan and Bernard, 2003, 
Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, Elo and Kyngäs, 2008).  
 
A strength, weakness, opportunity and threat (SWOT) analysis was also conducted to deduct 
the major lessons and recommendations. The findings were classified based on the following 
criteria: 
• Strengths: Characteristics (approach/actions) that have led or will potentially lead to 
an advantageous position (i.e. resilience). 
• Weaknesses: Characteristics that have led, or will potentially lead to a 
disadvantageous position (i.e. vulnerability) 
• Opportunities: Elements that could be exploited to enhance resilience. 
• Threats: Elements that could lead to major failure of the entire resilience approach. 
 
Table 2 - Research questions and source of information 
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Question Source of information 
1- What are the major criteria for effective management of mass casualty 
events? 
Literature 
2- What is the Turkish approach in building capacity to manage mass casualty 
events? 
Investigations 
 
a. What approach has been adopted to save capitals? Investigations 
b. What improvements have been made to the coordination and 
organisation of mass casualty events? 
Investigations 
c. How has resilience been integrated within development? Investigations 
3- What are the major lessons to be learned from the Turkish experience? Analysis and literature 
 
3. Literature review: Effective management of mass casualty events 
3.1 Requirements of surge capacity 
Sudden-impact disasters often lead to a sudden increase in demand for healthcare services 
due to injuries, worsening of chronically ill people and outbreaks (Stratton and Tyler, 2006). 
Disasters, therefore, may evolve into what internationally is defined as a mass casualty event, 
a situation in which the healthcare services lose their capability to manage the influx of 
patients (WHO, 2007a). In this situation the provision of uninterrupted healthcare services is 
a matter of life and death (PAHO, 2008). A healthcare service must have a suitable surge 
capacity defined as “a measurable representation of ability to manage a sudden influx of 
patients. It is dependent on a well-functioning incident management system and the variables 
of space, supplies, staff and any special considerations (contaminated or contagious patients, 
for example)” (ACEP, 2012). In practice, this has resulted in increasing healthcare resources 
following empirical approaches that are not based on evidence and thus have been viewed as 
“obscure” (Schultz and Koenig, 2006). For example, the United States National Preparedness 
Guidelines (DHS, 2007) indicate that surge capacity is one of 37 fundamental capabilities 
that the nation must implement in order to be ready to face a disaster.  
 
Surge capacity has been empirically estimated as extra bed capacity in healthcare facilities of 
500 beds per million population for patients with symptoms of acute infectious disease, and 
50 beds per million population for non-communicable diseases and injuries, such as trauma 
or burns (HRSA, 2006). In reality, the problem of surge capacity is much more complex and 
includes at least three essential elements; continuous supplies, sufficient number of healthcare 
professionals, and infrastructure with appropriate medical equipment (Hammond, 2005, 
Barbisch and Koenig, 2006, Kaji et al., 2006, Christian et al., 2008).  
 
Researchers have been actively studying surge capacity each from their own point of view. 
For example, Achour (2007), Zhong et al. (2014) and Jacques et al. (2014) developed 
comprehensive approaches to evaluate the resilience of hospital buildings. In addition to 
these academic studies, experts recently revised the WHO Hospital Safety Index (WHO, 
2015) which also provides a good combination of structural and non-structural safety and 
emergency and disaster management. Researchers also looked in detail at the different 
aspects of hospital resilience such as design perspective Pascale et al. (2014), post-earthquake 
structural and non-structural performance Achour et al. (2011), and post-earthquake utilities 
performance (Achour et al., 2014, Myrtle et al., 2005). Others investigated the resources 
supporting the emergency response process such as estimating number of casualties 
(Trendafiloski et al., 2008, Turkan and Özel, 2014), and mapping damage to identify 
potential injuries (Wegscheider et al., 2013).  
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Literature thus indicates that an effective healthcare surge capacity must have at least the 
physical ability to extend its space capacity as well as sufficiently available resources, and 
managerial capability. This concurs very well with recent findings of Kearns et al. (2014) 
who reviewed the development and progress of surge capacity since the 1900s concluding 
that the current understanding of surge capacity involves staff, space, supplies and the 
standard of care.  
3.2 Principles of mass casualties management 
The successful healthcare response to mass casualty event depends on the effective 
coordination of the three major response phases pre-hospital care, casualty distribution, and 
hospital care (CDC, 2010). Effective medical management is an essential element of the pre-
hospital care in mass casualty events, and it depends on the appropriate use of resources for 
timely treatment. Triage is usually used to dispatch patients to the most suitable healthcare 
providers with the aim to efficiently allocate limited healthcare resources (Jenkins et al., 
2008). Consequently, triage officers are expected to be fully aware of the geographical 
location of healthcare facilities, emergency departments and specific care centres (e.g. trauma 
and burns) (Kennedy et al., 1996). The evacuation of mass casualties needs to be designed to 
provide specialized care to specific individuals, such as those with burns and crush injuries, 
and to move critical, and high resource consumers, injuries, to resource-rich areas (Born et al., 
2007). Critical patients, as suggested by Pre-hospital Trauma Life Support (PHTLS) 
guidelines, should be transferred promptly after primary triage and resuscitation preferably to 
a Level I trauma centre. Non-urgent patients should be dispatched to further emergency 
departments in order to reserve the nearer facilities for treating urgent and self-evacuated 
patients. On arrival at the hospital area, casualties receive a secondary triage, classify as 
either critical, severe or moderate. For this reason, it is important to organise a triage area 
outside the emergency department entrance to minimise the re-triage procedures inside the 
emergency department (Hammond, 2005). In summary, an effective mass casualty 
management depends at least on: effective coordination of the three response phases, 
competent triage staff with adequate resources and information, and management processes 
that take into consideration vulnerable people (e.g. chronically ill people).  
4. Turkish experience in mass casualty events 
4.1 Reforming the approach of resilience 
Resilience has been defined as “the ability of a system, community or society exposed to 
hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of the hazard in a 
timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its 
essential basic structures and functions” (UNISDR, 2009, WHO, 2015). This definition 
indicates that resilience has to take into consideration a holistic view of the system and all its 
components, which can be physical, technical, social and/or psychological, as suggested in  
Alexander (2013)’s recent concept. The holistic resilience concept is essential for the 
healthcare service due to its complexity and intertwined components, any damage to any of 
these components could result in partial or total failure of the service (see Figure 4). Resilient 
healthcare does not imply only meeting the business continuity obligations, but also 
addressing the social, moral and ethical necessity, and enhancing the public confidence 
(UNISDR, 2008). In order for the healthcare service to save lives, it has to be physically and 
functionally resilient (WHO, 2007b). This denotes that resilience needs to go beyond 
strengthening the infrastructure (Achour et al., 2011) to include other aspects that are 
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essential for maintaining the continuity of the service. These aspects could be finding ways to 
reduce the impact of other infrastructures’ failures (Achour et al., 2014), empowering people 
to interact more with other emergency agencies (Achour et al., 2015), and developing 
strategies to improve response to major hazards (Achour and Price, 2010). The findings of 
this study suggest that the Turkish authorities are implementing a more resilient approach due 
to lessons gained from previous experience.   
 
  
Many projects have been launched in Turkey to improve the structural capacity of 
infrastructure. Amongst these projects is the €1,129 million Istanbul Seismic Risk Mitigation 
and Emergency Preparedness (ISMEP) project, started in 2006 and expected to end in 2017. 
This project sought to strengthen emergency capacity, along with seismic risk mitigation for 
priority public buildings and enforcement of building codes. To target needs for emergency 
capacity and provide a single approach for emergency response, the General Directorate of 
Emergency Management, the General Directorate of Civil Defence and the General 
Directorate of Disaster Affairs have been replaced with the Disaster and Emergency 
Presidency (AFAD) in 2009. Within this approach, the Ministry of Health’s Disaster and 
Emergency Coordination Centre (SAKOM) is in charge of the overall coordination in the 
disaster area, including provincial disaster centres. Provincial disaster centres are in charge of 
mobilising search and rescue services such as the police, fire brigade, civil defence and other 
rescue organisations. Different organisations work in partnership when responding to 
emergency calls to rescue injuries and provide medical care. For example, the Search and 
Rescue Division of the Civil Defence is responsible rescuing people from collapsed buildings, 
the National Medical Rescue Teams (UMKE) provides primary care immediately after rescue, 
non-governmental search and rescue associations (e.g. AKUT) play a major role in relief 
following earthquakes and mining organisations support search and rescue efforts because of 
their specific resources and equipment. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: A simplified model for hospital dependencies (internal and external systems). 
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Source: (Achour 2007, 2015) 
 
4.2 Surge capacity improvements: resources 
In the likelihood of an earthquake in Istanbul and as part of the ISMEP project, enormous 
resources have been allocated to building surge capacity. Significant reform work for 
healthcare infrastructure renovation has been undertaken, including the construction of new 
healthcare facilities, retrofitting and renovating existing facilities and increasing bed capacity. 
Healthcare facilities have been designed to have, single and double patient rooms, each being 
equipped with enough connections to double their capacity, and underground parking space, 
allowing green areas to be used for evacuation when needed.  
 
On a daily basis, emergency departments in Istanbul treat an average of 1,000 patients. This 
indicates that the current facilities are constantly crowded, but also that clinical and non-
clinical staff have developed a strong capability and process to deal with large numbers of 
patients. Plans are to increase the capacity of these departments. The departments have a floor 
area of between 10,000 and 14,000 square metres, higher than the maximum values proposed 
by international guidelines such as the UK Health Building Notes – HBN 22 – (DH, 2005) 
and the Australasian College for Emergency Medicine (ACEP, 2005). However, the location 
of healthcare facilities is still under debate. Whilst some interviewees view it critical to have 
the facilities within the city in order to shorten injuries travel distances, others saw this as 
challenging in terms of injuries, patient transfer and continuity of supplies (e.g. medication 
and food). 
 
Concerns were expressed by the interviewees regarding continuous hospital utility supplies 
stating that ‘most of the government hospitals in Istanbul have all the emergency power 
generators, all the medical supplies and communication system at the bottom of the hospital’ 
(interviewee). This is a sensible solution for a hospital located in an earthquake prone area 
because equipment tend to destabilise in upper levels (Achour, 2007). However, because 
Istanbul is also exposed to floods, generators and fuel supply should ideally be in adjacent 
locations above flood levels (Achour et al., 2009, Stover, 2009). An effective solution to 
improve the resilience of the hospitals’ utilities would be provided by equipping ground 
floors with an anti-flooding system such as gates, which have been adopted in many hospitals 
around the world such as the Kaohsiung Municipal Hospital in Taiwan (Achour et al., 2009).  
 
In addition, ‘most hospitals in Istanbul are equipped with emergency generator fuel tanks of 
200 litres capacity, which is sufficient for approximately 4 hours’ (interviewee), whilst the 
World Health Organization (WHO) recommends sufficient fuel tank capacity for at least five 
days (PAHO, 2008). With regard to the number of healthcare professionals, interviewees 
reported that it is mandatory for Turkish emergency departments to have mass casualty event 
emergency plans. These plans must have clear procedures to recruit human resources in 
disaster situations and local healthcare authorities are willing to establish medical rescue 
teams in each city hospital. 
 
Interviewees expressed concerns over the lack of a clear vision with regard to major 
emergency response in Istanbul. They noted that the city hosts many thousands of old and 
vulnerable buildings. The occurrence of a major earthquake could lead to their collapse and 
thus inaccessibility for the rescue operations. The impact could expand to isolate the entire 
city. Ataturk Airport is located in an earthquake prone area and ‘maybe we cannot use this 
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airport after an earthquake’ (interviewee). Sabiha Gökçen International Airport is far from 
the city and is linked to the city through a very-traffic-congested urban motorway and ‘in the 
rush hour, with the traffic problems, you can’t use those motorways’, stated an interviewee. 
The two urban motorways, linking the European and the Asian sides, could be made unusable 
by damage, traffic or accidents. Access by ships is challenging because of potential damage 
to harbours. For all these reasons, it will be difficult to take patients out of the disaster area, 
but ‘it will also be difficult to receive external assistance within the first 24 or 48 hours’ 
(interviewee). This situation is aggravated by the lack of potential support from close cities 
due to Istanbul’s peculiar geographic location: ‘we don’t have closer cities to support us. 
Istanbul is not a city if you look at how far it is from its neighbouring cities resulting in it 
being viewed as a small country’ (interviewee). 
4.3 Mass casualty management: experience of Van earthquakes 
Whilst current surge capacity in Istanbul relies on healthcare infrastructures located in the 
disaster area, in Erciş and Van it relied on facilities located outside the disaster zones. An 
interviewee explained the rationale behind the difference of both approaches by stating that 
building capacity based on infrastructure located outside the disaster area ‘is not the solution 
for big places like Istanbul, or highly dense cities. The approach adopted in Van was easy to 
use in this region because the population is not high and the number of injured people was 
small. In Istanbul you cannot do that’. Transporting all patients to hospitals outside the 
disaster area was feasible during Van earthquakes because of the substantial resources 
allocated (see Table 3), the relatively low volume of population and recent mobile 
telecommunication system improvements. However, the investigation highlighted several 
concerns that need to be addressed.  
 
Table 3 - Allocated resources 
 
Resources Quantities 
Search and Rescue 5,267 search and rescue personnel 
34 search dogs 
Shelter 72,597 tents  
480 communal tents  
200 tarpaulins 
260 pre-fabricated houses  
2,711 containers  
3,794 Mevlana Houses 
151 toilet/shower containers 
Health 2,976 medical personnel 
11 mobile hospitals 
183 ambulances 
18 air ambulances 
Equipment 1 mobile oven 
732 construction machinery 
79 projectors 
146 generators 
 
 
a. Site information: The management of the disaster zone was overseen by the Civil Defence. 
Search and rescue operations were led by the Search and Rescue Division of the Civil 
Defence, with the support of non-governmental search and rescue associations and 
organisations (e.g. AKUT). Approximately 20 minutes after Van Earthquake, the Disaster 
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and Emergency Coordination Centre (SAKOM) provided access to, and started searching for 
survivors within the disaster area. Initially, medical rescue was secured by local medical 
teams before the arrival of organisations such as the National Medical Rescue Team (UMKE) 
a few hours after the main shock. The initial challenge faced by the rescue teams was the 
estimation of  the amount of available resources (e.g. medical rescue teams, ambulances, 
equipment) and managing them based on the limited available information, one interviewee 
noted that ‘it was difficult to find maps of the area’ to locate collapsed buildings, and gather 
information about the number of victims. Collapsed buildings and casualties were identified 
through onsite inspections and information provided from local people, because immediately 
after the shock many people escaped from the disaster area without communicating their 
destination. Once the situation was assessed, a medical rescue team, an ambulance and a 
rescue vehicle were sent to each collapsed building. 
 
b. Coordination and collaboration: All 604 casualties caused by the 23rd October shock were 
transported to hospitals outside the disaster area. On 30th November, 102 patients (36 of them 
in critical condition) were transferred by planes to hospitals located in cities far away from 
the disaster area such as Ankara. Vulnerable individuals, such as the chronically ill, mentally 
disabled and those on dialysis were the most affected by these transfers due to the unclear 
coordination strategy. Coordinators were assigned by other cities and changed on a weekly 
basis: ‘we had a real problem of coordination because we did not have enough people with 
experience in earthquake and disaster management and the coordinators arriving from other 
cities change weekly’ (interviewee). This staffing change indicates a lost opportunity to gain 
knowledge that supports effective emergency activities and to develop coordination skills that 
could be used for future events. There were significant material and human resources that 
were not exploited to their full potential. Most of the volunteers worked as part of national 
and international emergency teams making them invaluable resources. Yet, ‘they didn’t know 
what to do; there was nobody taking control and making decisions; this was a big problem – 
that of coordination’ (interviewee). An interviewee confirmed by saying: ‘now we have more 
professional teams, more mobile equipment, more vehicles, which is a good development sign 
for our country; however, effectiveness is still to be targeted’ (interviewee). ‘By using less 
human resources and working in a much more coordinated manner we would have done 
more effective rescues’ (interviewee). Interviewees also highlighted that collaboration 
between emergency teams was also a challenge. An interviewee stated ‘we worked well with 
other teams, but we had problems with coordination and logistics”, and another added “we 
worked well with our team but not with other UMKE teams’. The reason behind this is that, 
even if each agency had developed its own plans and training, there were no common plans 
for coping with major disasters. An interviewee stated that ‘the crisis centre is creating 
contingency plans with rehearsals and simulations, but there are individual procedures 
which are not communicated to other agencies. We are conducting our own contingency 
plans in our hospitals, as is the national medical rescue team, the fire department, the police 
department, and there is no sharing of strategies’. In summary, the constant change in 
coordination meant a constant lack of clarity combined with absence of leadership and 
collaboration between teams led to less effective use of resources and difficult environment 
for emergency operations. 
 
c. Casualties distribution and hospital care: The triage protocol used during Erciş and Van 
earthquakes was a four level process: Ambulatory, Delayed, Immediate and Deceased. This is 
part of procedure used by medical rescue teams, in which all members are aware of their 
roles. However, this protocol was not always used during the evacuation and dispatch process. 
An interviewee stated that ‘everybody knows what triage is but they don’t use it’. Failing to 
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follow a triage process will potentially led to inappropriate distribution, overwhelming 
receiving centres that would not be in position to care for patients (Zoraster et al., 2007). 
Patients were transferred from the impact zone to the Advanced Medical Posts (AMPs). 
These acted as triage and stabilisation points for patients before transporting them to the most 
appropriate hospital. In Erciş, immediately after the earthquake, an AMP was set up in a 
sports complex for 5 days before a tent hospital was erected in the adjacent car park. The 
choice of this location was made based on the availability of sufficient parking space for the 
large number of ambulances and helicopters and situation outside of the city, i.e. more 
convenient for moving patients to other cities. The dispatch process involved multiple 
receiving facilities. The Crisis Centre was thus in continuous communication with hospitals 
via the 112 Command Centre, seeking information regarding their capacity to receive patients. 
Patient transfer was provided through a number of different organisations with SAKOM 
coordinating the health response and providing both ground ambulances and helicopter/plane 
ambulances. Turkish military also provided helicopters and planes at night and in difficult 
weather conditions. 
  
‘Emergency departments in Turkey operate normally above their capacity’ (interviewee) and 
it took them two hours on average to be ready to accept patients from the disaster area. 
According to PHTLS guidelines, critical casualties are to be transferred after primary triage 
and resuscitation to Level 3 Hospitals. Dynamic solutions were set in place to reach the 
appropriate surge capacity; the main approach was to rapidly discharge patients already in 
hospital. Once in hospital, patients were admitted through their emergency department, where 
they received a second triage and from here sent to the hospital final destination. Figure 5 has 
been developed to provide a visual illustration of the process followed in Erciş and Van 
earthquakes. 
 
d. Care in the recovery phase: After the earthquakes, approximately 40,000 people, including 
local healthcare staff, left the region fearing more earthquakes. Many of the healthcare staff 
who remained in the area were traumatised and refused to enter healthcare facilities. For 
example, in Van Regional Training and Research Hospital (VRT&R Hospital), staff members 
were unable to perform their duties. One interviewee reported that ‘there are operating 
theatres and intensive care units here, but they didn’t want to use them; it was regrettable to 
transport patients, who could easily be treated in their current location, out of the area’. All 
medical functions, apart from emergency services, were provided in tents located in the 
parking area in spite of the weather condition and the good state of the hospital building. The 
three month-old-hospital was designed according to the most recent seismic code, and 
successfully resisted the tremors. It was designed with the intention to not only hold large 
meetings and conferences but also to expand its capacity to accommodate the need of mass 
casualty events (see Figure 6). 
 
The healthcare system relied on the support of medical rescue teams, which with the support 
of mobile teams, provided on-going care in rural areas for individuals who are incapable of 
reaching hospitals or local medical centres. In Erciş field hospital, 195 volunteers, of whom 
40 were doctors, provided a large range of services such as emergency care, obstetrics and X-
rays despite the temperature being several degrees below zero. As a result, interviewees 
expressed concerns with regard to the load of work. Another interviewee reported that ‘the 
work is very hard and we are very tired’ expressing the need to improve ‘work and health 
conditions, by providing better resting areas for rescue teams’. 
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Two months after the earthquake, the Ambulance Service call centre was receiving an 
average of 8,000 calls per day. Once telephonic triage was performed by qualified staff, 
ambulances were dispatched. However, the damage caused by the quakes, the delays in the 
post-earthquake building safety evaluation and the shortage of healthcare staff meant that 
medical care was limited and thus a decision was needed on whether to transfer the patient to 
a different city or deal with the situation locally. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 - Patient flow management in Van earthquakes 
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Figure 6a - Ground floor                            Figure 6b - First floor 
Figure 6- VRT&R Hospital flexible space 
 
 
5. Discussion 
Despite the vagueness and complexity associated with surge capacity, there are criteria for 
measurement that could provide information about the ability to manage mass casualty events. 
These include sound infrastructure and continuous supply and capability to accommodate 
sudden and progressive influx of patients. They also require sufficient material and 
competent human resources; and adequate processes for coordination, triage and evacuation. 
These have been reflected in the major lessons that Turkey learned from its previous 
experience specifically in terms of saving capital through minimising resource losses, 
improving organisation and coordination in search and rescue, reducing bureaucracy, 
enhancing logistical support, training and organising voluntary efforts, and integrating 
resilience in the development (building resilient infrastructure and public buildings, enforcing 
codes, improving inspection during construction). Many of these targets have met the criteria 
for mass casualty events management. However, more work is needed in order to ensure that 
there is sufficient capacity to cope with major hazards such as that expected in Istanbul. 
These strengths and weaknesses, in addition to opportunities and threats have been 
summarised in Figure 6 and detailed in the following sections. 
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Figure 7 –Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats 
 
 
5.1 Saving capitals 
A major work has been conducted to improve the resilience of infrastructure in terms of 
building new facilities and retrofitting existing to meet the requirements of the new seismic 
code, in addition to enforcing building codes. More research needs to be conducted on the 
geographic location of strategic infrastructure, such as hospitals, in disaster prone areas. This 
will potentially lead not only to a reduction in the death toll, but also to saving costs 
associated with healthcare buildings damage. It would also save many hospitals from being 
damaged and thus lead to extra capacity to deal with sudden and progressive influx of injuries. 
Some of these hospitals are exposed to more than one risk. These require the adoption of a 
multiple hazard approach. Failing to do so could lead facilities to an inoperable state such as 
happened with the Taiwanese Kaohsiung Municipal Hospital, which lost records of 500,000 
patients records stored in the underground floor (Achour and Price, 2010). 
 
5.2 Improvements to organisation and coordination 
Successful healthcare response to mass casualty events depends on the effective coordination 
of the three major response phases: pre-hospital care, casualty distribution, and hospital care 
(CDC, 2010). The integration of the governmental directorates in 2009 was expected to 
reduce much of the fragmentation, provide a clearer vision and produce stronger processes. 
However, this is expected to be a lengthy process. On the ground, the investigations 
demonstrated that there are several concerns related to the coordination of the emergency 
operations. These have potentially led to ineffective use of resources and exposed seriously 
injured and critically ill people to higher risks through transferring them to other cities. 
Challenges with coordination are not unique to Turkey. However, each country has its own 
set dictated by its environment as demonstrated by Achour et al. (2015) for UK healthcare 
emergency planning. The availability of site information (such as details of local population 
and fragilities of buildings and infrastructures) could have provided opportunities to save 
capital in terms of allocating resources efficiently and effectively. Recent publications 
demonstrate that this issue has been the focus of Turkish researchers such as Turkan and Özel 
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(2014) who developed a model to estimate the number of casualties of destructive 
earthquakes. This could be a good start to support emergency response and planning in 
Turkey if it is further elaborated. Coordination also requires strong collaboration from people 
on the ground such as hospital staff in order to ensure that processes are followed carefully. 
The stress and behaviour of some staff members (e.g. in VRT&R Hospital) could have 
aggravated the situation and challenged the emergency response. This anxiety was also 
recently discovered in the education sector (Menteşe, 2014), indicating the need to develop 
the leadership and skills of professionals as part of emergency planning. Despite this difficult 
situation, there are many positive signs (such as considerable resources and competent and 
enthusiastic staff) indicating that the country is well able to develop an exemplary healthcare 
emergency model. The findings suggest that the effectiveness of this model depends on: (1) 
the ability to collect information from sites immediately after a disaster; (2) enhancement of 
the effective use of resources; (3) ability of healthcare staff members to perform their critical 
role in the rescue chain; (4) addressing the need of healthcare and rescue teams (e.g. welfare, 
PTSD, relevant trainings); and (5) enhancing the communication between the teams and 
agencies pre- and post-disasters. 
 
5.3 Integration of resilience within development 
In many countries such as Turkey, resilience has often been thought of as the ‘robustness of 
infrastructure’ or the ‘management of disasters’ and rarely from a holistic point of view, 
where infrastructure robustness, planning and management are well integrated and thought 
through. Prior to 1999, the Turkish authorities thought that resilience is the ability to manage 
disasters. However, the 1999 Kocaeli Earthquake demonstrated that this is ineffective and 
thus adopted a disaster prevention approach. For instance, the retrofitting of existing and 
construction of new facilities incorporated the new construction code (law enforcement), 
need for mass casualty scenarios (bed capacity), and healthcare processes (evacuation and 
triage processes). However, the investigations demonstrate that there are concerns about 
inadequate risk assessment, failure to adopt a multiple-hazard approach for hospitals, and 
lack of clear vision for the redevelopment of Istanbul. The City is in urgent need of a clear 
strategy to drive the redevelopment. This strategy could be developed based on the findings 
of this, and other research work (e.g. Mitchell (1999), Trice (2006), Izadkhah and Hosseini 
(2010) and Hochrainer and Mechler (2011)), loss estimation tools (e.g. Trendafiloski et al. 
(2008) and Turkan and Özel (2014)), and advanced use of simulation. Recent governments 
have been very active in addressing resilience, dealing with it as a ‘top priority’ and driving it 
through. 
 
6. Conclusion 
For many years, Turkey dealt with disasters from a reactive point of view. However, after 
understanding its ineffectiveness, it adopted a proactive approach. This new approach is 
driven by proactivity, anticipation, mitigation, comprehensiveness and prevention. Major 
efforts have been made to retrofit existing, and build new infrastructure according to the 
requirements of the new seismic resistance code, and to have sufficient flexibility to deal with 
mass casualties. Many of the directorates have also been merged in order to reduce 
bureaucracy and enhance effectiveness; and significant resources have been accumulated.  
 
This study investigated the impact of this new approach on the resilience of healthcare 
emergency response following Van earthquakes. The findings suggest that the approach 
succeeded in:  
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• developing a single vision by consolidating official efforts in a more structured way 
(i.e. development of AFAD and SAKOM);  
• mobilising many governmental and non-governmental organisations (e.g. Army and 
volunteering teams);  
• securing significant amounts of resources including physical and human; and 
• ensuring that infrastructure is resilient and sufficiently flexible to expand its capacity. 
 
This implies that the overall performance of the healthcare emergency response has improved 
and thus the new resilient approach is progressing. However, more attention is required to the: 
• development of stronger management procedures (e.g. coordination, inter-agencies 
collaboration, vulnerable people, restoration process, and faster building safety 
evaluation); and 
• enhancement of current resources (e.g. site information). 
 
The Turkish authorities have an advantageous opportunity to combine lessons learnt from 
national and international experience, resources, procedures and computer simulation to 
develop and run a set of scenarios. These scenarios will help in clarifying the vision and lead 
to the development of a comprehensive emergency model. This model is expected to reduce 
risk in major and vulnerable cities such as Istanbul. This study will be developed further to 
support the development of this model by benchmarking the Turkish approach with 
international approaches. 
 
The limitations of this study are mainly the inability to get more details about the activities of 
particular parties such as international aid organisations and their role within the bigger 
picture, the statics about baseline on the pre-earthquake staff coverage, patients’ transfers and 
outcomes, and ratio of survival. These will be the focus of our future research plans. 
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